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Summary findings
Bond and Estache  show that the potential benefits to a  demand for coverage  is likely to be stronger in South
host country of forward markets or of foreign  exchange  Asia than in Latin America.  In East Asia,  the evidence is
guarantees depend on the investor's  country of origin  mixed.
and on specific  charactcristics  of the investment.  They  Their main lessons  for bost  country  governments:
show this in terms of the effects  on foreign-exchange  In the short run, if there are no private forward
risks and on the amount of foreign direct investment  markets, the optimal policy  for a risk-neutral  host
taking place.  country is to provide the firm with forward contracts at
Their  main lessons  for foreign  investors:  the expected spot exchange rate. This government
* The benefits  of hedging exchange risks  through  insurance has the same effects  as allowing  trading in
forward markets vary substantially,  depcnding on the  forward markets.  But these contracts can have fiscal
investor, the type of investment, and, for foreign  direct  consequences,  as they did in Latin America.
investment  (FDI), the direction of the market supplied.  * Forward markets do not discriminate against host-
* For short-lived  investment or FDI targeted to the  country firms. Those engaged  in international trade can
host country market, the potential for gain from forward  also benefit from the presence  of forward markets.
contracts is substantial  because  in the short run, nominal  *  In the medium run, as exchange controls are being
exchange  rate fluctuations  tend to be larger than real  liberalized,  forward markets may be slow  to develop
exchange  rate fluctuations.  because of participants' uncertainty about their ability to
* For long-lived  investments  or export-oriented FDI,  get foreign currency to cover forward commitments.  In
the gains from forward contracts will be much smaller.  this transitional period, contracts offered  by the
Firms  investing in long-lived  assets  or in activities  government are likely  to be the most efficient means of
targeted to exports get natural insurance from the  reassuring  foreign investors.  These contracts should also
correlation between  the nominal exchange rate and the  be made available  to host-country  firms during the
firm's earnings in host-country currency.  transitional  period, in order not to discriminate  against
* The evidence  on exchange  rate and price  domestic  investors.
fluctuarions  between 1975 and 1991 suggests  that the
This  paper  - a product  of the South  Asia  Regional  Office,  Office  of the Chief Economist  - is part of a larger  effort in  the Bank
to address  issucs  that cut across  countries  in  the region.  Copies  of the paper  arc availablc  free  from  the World  Bank,  1818  H Strect
N1W,  Washington,  DC 20433. Please  contact  Antonio  Estache,  room Q7-123,  extension  81442  (33 pages).  August  1994.
The Policy Rzsarch UWorking  Paper  Series  dssemnates she fndigs  of work in progress  to encowage the excbange  of ides  about
dcvlopmenissues  An obiectie  of th sefies  is  to  get the  findings  outquicly. even  if the  presentations  are ess  than  fieRy  polished.  The
papers  cary the  names  of the  autors and  sboadd  be  used  and  cited  accordingly.  The  findings,  itesrpretations,  and  condusions  ar the
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I. Introduction
Foreign direct  investment (FDI)  can involve substantial  risk for firms.
In addition to  the normal risks of doing business  (eg. uncertainty about
productivity  of factors,  input  costs,  and  demand  for  the  firm's  product)  the  firm
faces additional uncertainty  because its investment is located abroad.  In
particular,  FPI leads  to risk due  to: (i)  fluctuations  in  the currency  value of
the returns earned abroad  and  (ii) changes in government  policy in the host
country after the firm's entry into the foreign country.  Since these highly
country specific  risks tend to deter investment,  their level is important  in
determining  how successful  a  host country  is likely  to be in attracting  FDI.  To
reduce  these  risks,  some  developing  host  country  governments,  in  particular  those
with closed capital accounts,  have relied  on or considered  programs  offering
hedging  mechanisms  to foreign  investors.  In  South  Asia, Pakistan  already  covers
some specific  types of foreign  investments  and India  and Bengladesh  have also
recently  discussed  coverages  for foreign  investors,  similar  to those available
to  importers  or  to  public  entreprises  in  many Latin American countries--e.g.
Argentina,  Ecuador,  Venezuela--  during  the  1980s.  1
The  paper  examines  the  potential  benefits  to  the  host  country  of  insurance
programs  in  terms  of  their  effects  on  risks  and  on  the  amount  of  FDI taking
place.  It  focuses  on  foreign  exchange  guarantees  to  foreign  investors  as  a  oeans
of  hedging  foreign  exchange  risk.  It  ignores  the  quasi-fiscal  consequences  of
foreign  exchange  guarantees  although  they  have  proven  to  be  critical  in  their
rejection  in  Latin  America.  It  compares  the  benefits  of  these  programs  with  the
benefits  obtained  by  liberalizing  financial  markets  to  allow  hedging  of  exchange
risk  in  forward  markets.2
Why focusing  only  on  the  foreign  exchange  risk?  Guarantees  against  elements
of risk such as  productivity,  output  price,  etc, faced  by a foreign  investor  are
likely  to be very costly to the government  because of the presence of moral
hazard and adverse selection  problems--the  firm can affect  the probability  of
losses.  The fact that private  insurance  markets for these risks do not exist
suggests  that information  problems make this type of insurance  too costly to
provide.  One would not expect  the government  to have the information  about  the
firm's business and effort levels necessary to insure  these risks.  Foreign
exchange  risks,  however,  represent  a  source  of  uncertainty  that cannot  be altered
by  the  firm's  actions.  Morevover, the  existence of  forward markets  in
industrialized  economies  suggests  that insurance  against  exchange  losses  can  be
profitably  provided. 2
There  are  two issues  that are  involved  in  government  guarantees  concerning
this exchange  risk.  The first is a pure insurance  motive. It arises  when risk
averse  investors  want  to  hedge  the  risk  due  to uncertainty  about  the future  value
of a currency. The  argument  for  government  provision  of insurance  in  this case
relies on the government being less risk averse  than the firm, so that the
insurance  improves  efficiency  by having the risk being borne by the less risk
averse  agent.  The issue  then is  to derive  the  benefits  obtained  from  contracts
between the foreign investor  and  the host country  regarding  exchange  risk, and
to compare  these benefits  with those obtained  by the  use of forward  markets.
The second  issue  concerns  the  possibility  that the government  has  private
information  about  future  policies  which  will  affect  the  value  of  the  exchange
rate or the  ability of the  firm to convert its host currency into foreign
currency. The  benefits  from  provision  of guarantees  in this case  arise  from  the
difference  in  beliefs  about  future  rates  between  the firm  and  the  government,  and3
do not rely on the presence  of risk aversion. Guarantees in this cams may be
used  by  the government  to  provide  credibility  to  announcements  of  policy  reform,
by altering  the firm's  beliefs  about  the government's  future  policy.
The  paper  focuses  on  the  insurance  motive  for  provision  of  guarantee.. Thu
policy  credibility  motive  is  discussed  in  a  companion  paper.  Section  II focuses
on the perspective  of the firm.  It presents  a model of investment  deecsions  by
a risk averse  multinational  firm,  and  derives  the effect  of uncertainty  on the
amount  of investment  the  firm  places  in  the  host  country.  Section  III  derives  the
optimal  policy for  the host country  in dealing  with a foreign  firm. Section  IV
concludes.  Througout  these sections,  the  empirical  relevance  of the  theoretical
results  is tested  for  a  sample  of 12  countries  representing  South  Asai,  East  Asia
and Latin  America.
1I.  Exchange  Risk  and  Foreign  Investment  with  Convertible  Currencr
This  section  presents  a  model  of a  risk averse  multinational  firm  choosing
its  optimal  level  of  investment  in  a  risky  investment  project.  In  order  to  focus
on  the  benefits  to  the  firm  and  the  host  government  of  using  forward  narkets  to
insure  against  exchange  rate  risks,  the  firm  and  the  government  are  assumed,  in
this  section,  to  have  the  same  expectations  about  future  exchange  rate  movements.  3
First,  the  section  considers  a  multinational  firm's  optimal  level  of
investment  in  the  case  where  there  are  no  forward  markets  for  shifting  risk.  It
shows  that  increases  in  the  level  of  real  exchange  rate  risk  lead  to  less  direct
foreign-  investment  by  the  firm.  The  impact  of  the  introduction  of  forward
contracts  on  the firm's  investment  decision  is  analyzed  next.  It  showu  that  risk
averse host country firms can also benefit from the introduction  of forward4
markets  when their  host country  returns  are  correlated  with the  nominal  exchange
rate.  The  availability of  forward markets ham  the potential to  increase
investment by host country firms in export-oriented industries as well  as
encouraging  multinational  investments  in host country  projects.
The emphasis in this section is on the importance  of the relationship
between  nominal  exchange  risk  and  real  exchange  rilsk  in  determining  the  benefits
of  forward markets.  The  gains  from hedging in  forward markets  for the
multinational  firm are  shown  to be smallest  when purchasing  power  parity  holds,
and where the firm is primarily engaged in production for the export market.
Data  on correlations  between nominal  exchange  rate changes and relative  price
level  changes  for  a  number  of  countries  are  presented  to illustrate  the  magnitude
of  gains from  hedging. The section  concludes  with-  a simulation  illustrating  how
the level of investment  responds  to the presence  of markets for hedging risk
under  alternative assumtpions  about the  correlation between nominal exchange rate
changes  and relative  price level  changes  across  countries.
A. Investment  Levels  with No Forward  Markets
Consider  a risk averse  multinational  firm  that is allocating  investments
between its home country  and a host country. 4 The host country is BAPAIN and
the source country (home of the multinational)  is JAPAUS.  The firm has an
initial  stock of capital,  W, which it must allocate  between home country and
foreign country projects.  The stock of capital is measured in terms of the
JAPAUS  consumption  good,  which  is  the  deflator  for  source  country  nominal  income.
The  real retuzn  from  source  country  projects  is assumed  to be a certain  return,
r, which is constant  and independent  of the quantity  invested. 5
An investment  in BAPAIN  of amount  K  yields  a return  ao(K),  where 4  is a5
strictly  concave  function  and a is  a random  variable. The  units of measurmemnt
for  the  host  country  capital  stock  and  project  returns  is  thu  BAPAIN  consumption
good,  which is the  deflator  for host country  consumption. The random  variable
a captures the stochastic  element of real returns in the host country, and
includes  factors  such  as the  relative  price of  output (measured  in terms  of the
foreign  consumption  good),  relative  input  prices,  and productivity  levels  that
affect  the real profits  of the firm.  The atrict  concavity  of 0  capturms  the
diminishing  returns  to the investment  in the host country.
Two factors  distinguish  the risks  captured  by a.  First,  a large  share  of
these  risks  are  uninsurable. Firms  may be able  to mitigate  the  effects  of  price
fluctuations  to some degree through long term contracting  relationships.  But
moral hazard and adverse selection  problems  prevent firms from being able to
insure firm-specific  risk elements  such as the productivity  of inputs  and the
market'  s  taste for  the  product. Firms cannot  purchase  insurance  against  losses
from  macroeconomic  fluctuations  because  losses  resulting  from  shifts  in  aggregate
demand  are  difficult  to distinguish  from  losses  due  to inefficiency  of  the  firm.
Private insurers would expect that  if  they made  insurance against losses
available,  the average profitability  of firms would decline because of the
weakening  of incentives  to  produce  efficiently. Since  in  general  the  government
has  no particular  advantage  over  the  private  sector  in  dealing  with  moral  hazard
problems  of  this  type,  government  attempts  to  insure  firms  against  louses  would
encounter  similar  problems  and would be inefficient.
The second  factor  is that the risks  included  in a  are faced  by both host
country and source country investors.  BAPAIN investors  may have a superior
knowledge  of the local  market, and thus have a lower  variance associatsd  with
productivity  and  taste  factors,  but  they  still  are  subject  to  these  risks.  The6
random  variable  a captures  the  uncertainty  of  the  project  in  terms  of the  BAPAIN
consumption  good,  and  the riskiness  of a indicates  the  degree  of risk faced  by
a BAPAIN  firm  that invests  in the  project.
The  calculatation  of  the  risk  to  the  multinational  requires  the  conversion
to units  of the JAPAUS  consumption  good.  We will refer  to the  JAPAUS  currency
am dollar.,  and  the  BAPAIN  currency  as rupees. Letting  P be  the  dollar  price  of
the  JAPAUS  consumption  good at  the  end  of the  period,  P  the  rupee  price  of  the
BAPAIN  consumption  good,  and  B the  nominal  exchange  rate  (dollars  per  rupee),  the
return  to the JAPAUS  based  multinational  from the inveatment  project  will be
EP*ao  (K)/P. Defining  e  =  EP'/P  to  be  the  real  exchange  rate  between  unite  of  the
JAPAUS  consumption  good  and  the  BAPAIN  consumption  good  and  choosing  units  such
that  both  the  price  levels  and  the  exchange  rate at  the  beginning  of  the  period
are  unity,  the-profits  of  the  multinational  in dollars  at  the end  of the  period
wLll be6
r  a,ae)  =ea (K*)  +  (W-K  )r  (1)
If  the  multinational  firm  is  risk  neutral,  it  will  choose  K*  to  maximize  expected
profits. The  optimal  capital  level  under  risk  neutrality,  K ,  will  be the  value
at which  the  expected  marginal  rate  of return  in  the foreign  country  equals  r.
A  risk  averse  firm  chooses  XC to  maximize  the  expected  utility  of  profits,
V(rK)=ffu  r(K*,e,a))g(e.a)dade
-iiff  (2)
where U is a strictly  concave.  function  and g(a,e) is the joint probability
density  function  for  a  and  e.  The first  order  condition  for  optimal  choice  of
K* is
Vl (K*)=fJU 1 (7r) (aeo'  (K*)-r)g  (a,e)dade=O(
TU  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(3)7
The  optimal  choice  of K*  occurs  where  the  expected  marginal  utility  of the
difference  between  marginal  return  to capital  and its cost *quals  zero.  Since
the utility  function  io  strictly  concave,  U' is decreasing  in W.  This implies
that the risk averse firm puts relatively lens weight on favorable statem
(ae@'(K*)  > r)  than  does  the  rink  neutral  firm,  and  relatively  more  weight  on the
unfavorable  states  (ce0'(K  3  r).  It then follows  that if V' is evaluated  at
K,  where  expected  profits  equal zero,  we have  V'  (K)  c  0.  Also,  V"(K) is  negative
U and  0  are concave.  So the value  of K that satisfies (3)  is less  than K and an
increase in the  riskiness of  the  real exchange rate will  further reduce
investment. 7
In  the  presence  of real  exchange  rate  uncertainty,  the  fact that  the firm
reduces its investment  means that the expected marginal revenue product of
.capital in the host country exceeds r.  The difference  between the expected
marginal  product  of capital  and  r can  be thought  of as the risk  premium  that is
associated  with investment  in  BAPAIN  for  a  JAPAUS  investor.  If BAPAIN  is risk
neutral,  the  reduction  in  multinational  investment  that  resuiLs  from  the  presence
of  this  risk premium lowers  national  welfare.  To see this, suppose that the
government of BAPAIN could borrow at rate r and.  run the investment project
itself. Assuming  that  ae@'(K*)  is  the  marginal  social  product  of capital,  BAPAIN
would  choose  an investment  level  of K  in  the  project,  since  that in  the level  of
investment at which the expected marginal social product equals r.  EAPAIN
national  income  is lower  when the investment  level is below  K
It is not a practical policy for the government  to run the investment
project, since  the presence  of multinational  investment  normally  reflects  the
fact  that  the firm  has  superiority  in its  technology  or products  that give it an
advantage  over l,cal  investors. However,  the government  could  induce  the firm8
to invest up to  z  -
if it could insure  the firm's  return.  The discussion  above
suggested  that  it is also impractlcal  for  the country  to attempt to insure  the
firm for  risks amsociated  with a, because  this  would almost  certainly-lead  to a
decline in the expected  return from the project.  However,  the country  may  be
able  to  partially  insure  the  inveutor  by  offering  insurance  againot  exchange  rate
risks.  This has  the potential  to benefit  both the firm and the country,  mince
the firm  reduces  the  risk  of its  profit  stream  and  the country  obtains  a  greater
level  of investment. 8
B. Optimal Hedging  with Forward  Markets
(i)  When should  forward  markets  be attractive  to foreian investors?
This section  examines;  (i)  how  the  presence  of forward  markets  will affect
the level of risk faced  by the multinational  firm, and (ii)  the relationship
between  hedging  and  the  optimal  level  of investment. It also compares  the  value
of hedging for-the  JAPAUS  firm with that obtained  by a BAPAIN  firm.
One way of assessing  how the introduction  of forward  markets affects  the
riskiness of the multinational  firm is to examine  how the variance  of the rate
of return  of the investment  is affected  by hedging. The real  rate of return  to
a  JAPAUS investor, denoted rt,  can be  approximated by taking the  log of
aEqo(K)/K, where q  P  */P.  Since the beginning of period price levels and
exchange  rate  were  normalized  to  unity,  the  inflation  differential  between  JAPAUS
and  BAPAIN approximated  by  ln g  =  ln  P*-- ln  P and the rate of depreciation  of
the  nominal  exchange  rate by ln E.  The real rate of return  will  then.be
r*=in(  aP(K)  )lnE-(sw)
K  (4)9
The  real  rate  of  return  rink  thus  decomposes  into  three  component.t  (L)  the
real  rate of return (a)  risk  in the  host country,  (ii)  the nominal  exchange  rate
(E)  risk, and  (iii) the relativm  price level (q) rlik.  A BAPAIN firm that
lnvests  in a local  project  faces  only  the first  component  of rink,  mince  thL  in
the  real rate  of return  risk in terms  of the host country  consumption  good.  An
noted above, thin form of risk is unLnourable.  The sum of  the second two
components  constltutes  the  real  exchange  rate  risk,  which  is  the  additional  risk
faced  by the JAPAUS firm  when it repatriates  its host country  returns.
Even  though  a  BAPAIN  firm faces  only the  real  rate of return  rLik  a (since
it  produces  for  the  BAPAIN  market),  lt  is  not  necessarily  a  leis  risky  investment
for the BAPAIN firm than for the JAPAUS firm.  Suppose that the output from
project  in the  host country  is  exported  to the  foreign  country.  If  there  are  no
.other  sources  of uncertainty  for the project, the return in units of foreign
currency  is  PO(K)/E.  Comparing  this  with the case above,  this is equivalent  to
having  a =  P/(EP*),  so that  there is perfect  correlation  between  a  and the  rate
of depreciation  of the real  exchange  rate.  In this case,  the JAPAnUs  investors
are perfectly hedged against exchange'  rate fluctuations  because they receive
returns  that are linked  to dollar  prices.  BAPAIN investors  in such a project,
on  the other  hand,  would  face  rate  of return  fluctuations  in  terms  of rupees  and
would  benefit  from  access  to forward  exchange  markets.  Therefore,  in  evaluating
the  effects  of forward  markets  it is necessary  to consider  correlations  between
q, a, and  E.
As an example,  suppose  that the  JAPAUS  firm  completely  hedges  its  exchange
rate risk  with a contract  which allows it  to sell units  of foreign currency  at
the  end  of  the  period  for  F  units  of  home country  currency. This contract  hedges
the entire  return (capital  investment  plus profits)  of the multinational. The10
returns  of the JAPAUS investor  in this case will be
r Wln(aO(K))InF-(ir-v*).  <(5)
Consider  the effects  of hedging on the JAPAUS firm under  the assumption
that ln  a, In  E and ln  q are  all  normally  distributed. The  comparison  of (4)-  and
(5) shows that hedging may affect both the mean and variance of the foreign
investor's  rate  of  return  on  investments  in  BAPAIN. The  mean  rate  of  return  with
hedging  will be less (greater)  than that  without  hedging if the forward  rate is
greater (less)  than the expected  spot  rate.  We will concentrate  on the case in
which the BAPAIN  government  is risk neutral,  so that it is willing to offer a
forward  rate which is equal  to the expected  spot rate.
The  effect  of forward  hedging  on  the  variance  of  the  rate  of return  depends
on the correlation  between a, q, and  E.  For example,  consider  the case  where a
and  the real exchange  rate are  stochastically  independent,  so that the variance
of the JAPAUS firm's  unhedged  rate of return  is the sum of the variance  of the
real return and the variance  of the rate of change in the real exchange  rate.
The variance  of the unhedged  rate of return,  ar' can then be written as
+ (o2  +  2PqE°qOE  +  t).  (6)
The term in  parentheses  is the  variance  of  the real exchange  rate,  where Pqs  is
the  correlation  between  the  nominal  depreciation  of the source  currency  and  the
inflation  differential.
The  variance  of  the rate  of return  of the fully  hedged  investment  a2  will rH wl
be
2  2  +  (7)
rH  Oa  q,  '7)
The  relationship between the  riskiness of  the  hedged  and  unhedgedinvestments will depend on pqE.  If purchasing power parity  (PPP) holds between
the dollar and the rupee, then the rate of depreciation  of the dollar will equal
the difference betiween  the JAPAUS inflation rate and the BAPAIN inflation rate.
This implLes  PqE =  -1, which means that the variance in the real exchange rate
is zero.  Any  increase  in the rupee returns to the BAPAIN  investment that  is
caused by inflation will be exactly offset by depreciation  of the value of the
rupee, leaving the dollar value of the project returns unaffected.  In this case,
the firm is completely insured against nominal exchange rate risk, since the firm
is holding a real asset whose returns change with the price level.  Note that the
case of purchasing  power parity is an extreme one which will certainly not hold
at all points  in time.  However,  it does suggest that a negative  correlation
between E and q should be expected.
Table I illustrates the variance of the rate of return on a fully hedged
and an unhedged  investment under alternative assumptions  regarding  pqE and 4.
Examples  are  limited  to  PCB <  0,  since economic  theory  predicts  a negative
relationship  between q and E even if full PPP does not hold.  The lower is pqE,
the greater the natural insurance that is provided by the firm's real investment
and the smaller are the gains from hedging.  Note that when u  =  cE, the fully
hedged portfolio actually becomes riskier than the unhedged portfolio when PqE
c -.5.  The second and third rows show the effect of increases in 4E  on hedging.
Since  asset  prices  generally  fluctuate more  than  do goods  prices,  one would
anticipate  that  the  exchange  rate  would  be  more  variable  than  the  price  indexes.
An increase  in 4  raises  the benefits of hedging  for given values of the other
parameters.  This is reflected  in the fact that the hedged portfolio  continues
to  dominate  the  unhedged  pertfolio  for values  of  p  CE  <  -. 5  as  the  variance
increases.  Note  that  by  setting  (6) equal  to  (7),  we  can  solve  for  the12
correlation  at  which  the  risk  of  the  hedqed  portfolio  equals  that  of the  unhedged
portfollo,  p =  E/2aq.
Table I  Variance  of Rate of Return  for
Fully  Hedged and Unhedged  Portfolios
|_____________  |Fully  Hedged  Unhedged Investment
Variances  p=-.1  P=-.3  P=-.5  p=-.7
o2- 2=1  2  2.8  2.4  2.0  1.6
q  aE  -5  2  3.25  2.77  2.28  1.79
(72=1  a2=2  2  3.72  3.15  2.59  2.02]
The  results  of  Table  I  can  be  used  to  derive  some  predictions  regarding  the
types  of investment  where hedging  will be most valuable. Recent experience  has
indicated that  for  industrialized countries there  are  fairly  substantial
.deviations from purchasing power parity  for periods of several years.  Thus, in
the short run the potential  for gains  from hedging  in forward markets  could be
substantial.
These  results  suggest  that  one  factor  determining  the  value  of  forward
markets to the foreign investor  is the life of the investment  project.  For
short--lived  investments,  the  ability  to  hedge  exchange  risk  through  forward
market  transactions  may  be  quite  valuable  to  foreign  investors.  However,
investments  in  long-lived  assets  with  payoffs  in  home  country  currency  are  likely
to  go  unhedged.  With  long-lived  assets,  the  cases  in  which  there  is  a13
substantial depreciation  of the home currency  are likely to be those  In which
there is a substantially  higher rate of inflation  in the home currency  returns
from the project, so the real return to the foreign investor is not affected by
the exchange fluctuations. 9
(ii) In which  countries are forward markets or guarantees  desirable?
This  section  focuses  on  the  value  taken  around  the  world  by  the  two
indicators  suggested earlier to assess the desirability  of forward markets:  (a)
the correlation  between E and q and  (b)  the ratio of the variance of B to that
of q. The  lower  is the correlation  and  the higher  is the ratio  in any given
country, the stronger  are the payoffs  to  hedging. But the value of p is only  an
indicator of the degree of benefit US firms would receive from hedging a one year
real investment in the country. An indication of the longer term link is provided
by the sum of the mean annual rate of nominal  depreciation  is given by pe' and
of the mean inflation differential  is pq. This sum giveB gives an indication of
the  extent  to  which  the  average  change  over  the  period  is  consistent  with
purchasing  power parity,  sin:e PPP predicts  that pE +  Pq =  0- Table  focuses on
the  short  and  long  terms  PPP  indicators.  Table  III  focuses  on  the  second
indicator of incentive to provide forward protection.  Both Tables focuses on a
sample of countries  of Latin  America, South Asia, and East Asia over the period
1975-91.
Table  II compares  the  short  term  (measured every  year)  and  long term
(measured on the average value over the 16 year period) correlation value taken
by these  indicators  for investors  from the  US, Japan  and Germany.  For each
country, the first set of columns gives the value of the correlation  between  B14
and q from the perspective  of the three major  foreign investors  and the second
sect of columns gives the difference between mean E  and mean q). In general the
table shows that the annual movements  in E are lesB consistent with PPP than are
its long run movements.  10
TABLE  I I
COUNTRIES  INTERACTION  BETWEEN  DEPRECIATION  CE)-AND-INFLATION  DIFFERENTIAL.  -Cq
|-SNORT  -TER (CorreLation  coef.-betGeei  ELG  ER  C`Dfference  tween 
__________r.  ___-_  ; US  -- - JAPAN  =GERMANY  . . US  JAPAN.GERMANY
ILATIN  AMERICA
Brazi l  -0.978  -0.979  -0.981  -0.061  -0.100  -0.076
ChiLe  -0.919  -0.915  -0.903  0.000  -0.039  -0.015
Mexico  -0.770  -0.775  -0.722  -0.012  -0.051  -0.026
SOUTN ASIA  _  . _
BangLadesh  -0.715  -0.506  -0.502  -0.054  -O.085  -0.060
India  -0.546  -0.504  -0.385  -0.055  -o.oB6  -0.062
Pakistan  -0.414  -0.424  -0.292  -0.032  -0.063  -0.039
Sri  Lanka.  0.040  0.041  0.047  0.062  -0.093  -0.069
EAST  ASIA  l
Indonesia  -0.412  -0.403  -0.347  0.011  -0.079  -0055
Hal aysia  -0.164  0.274  0.355  0.027  -0.064  -0.039
Philippines  -0.596  -0473  -0.478  0.047  -0.04  -0.020
Thi  Lwnd  0.167  0.015  0.018  0.046  -0.045  -O.OZO
For Latin America, the correlation coefficients  and the PPP indicatoro  in
Table II suggest that all three types of investors enjoy good short and long run
predictors  of  exchange  rates  in  their  highly  inflationary  environment--this
statement  ia  much  more  robust  for  the  US  investors  than  for  the  other  two
investors and less robust for Brazil than for the other two host countries. There
is a high annual correlation  between currency devaluation  and inflation  rates.
Koreover,  the sum of pE  and pq  is not significantly  different  from 0 for any of15
the countries.  In these countries,  forward  markets  would  be of much less value
for  hedging  both short  run  and long  run investments  than in  other  countries  with
lower inflation  rates.
In South Asia, the correlation  coefficient  suggests  that a  US investor
would not beneflt significantly  from forward markets if he were to invent in
short  term  export  oriented  activities  in  Bangladesh  or India  but  if  would  benefit
from  it  in  Pakistan  and  very clearly  in  Sri  Lanka.  Japanese  and  German  investors
would  much  more  likely  to  benefit  from  forward  markets  in  all  4  countries.  For
long  lived  investments,  PPP  does  not  seem  to hold  perfectly in any  of the four
countries--also  of  the  indicators  are  cleariy  significantly  different  from  0.  In
practices,  the  need  for  exchange  risk  protection  is  stronger  for  German  and
Japanese  investors  than  it  is  for  US investors.  Real  exchange  rate  in  the  Region
have  shown  substantial  depreciation  over  the  period,  with  the  value  of  host
country currencies  declining  often much faster  than would be  predicted  by  the
inflation  differential.
In  East  Asia,  except  for  the  Philippines,  the  short  term  correlations
between  q  and  E  are  weak.  In  the  long  run,  the  real  exchange  rate  with  respect
to  USS has  appreciated  while  it  has  depreciated  with  respect  to  the  Deutsch  mark
and  the  Yen.  The  long  run  gap  between  the  depreciation  and  inflation
differentials  is  however  lower  than  for  South  Asia  which  suggest  a  lesser  lead
for  exchange  risk  protection  than  in  South  Asia.
Note that for  Malaysia, Sri  Lanka and Thailand,  the three  investors  may
be facing  correlations  in the opposite  direction  of what is predicted  by PPP.
In  each of these cases,  the exchange  rate  had been fixed  for  periods  of several
years,  with  devaluations  occurring  after  the  accumulated  lnflation  differentials
have  gotten  sufficiently  large.  In  these  countries,  the  hedging  would  be  very
valuable  for  firms  with  short-lived  investments.
But  these  correlation  indicators  only  tell  part  of  the  story  and  can  in
fact  be  somewat  misleading.  When  the  variance  of  the  nominal  exchange  rate,  3,
is significantly  higher  than  the  variance  of  the  inflation  differential,  q,  there
are also strong  payoffs to hedging.  Table III shows  that this second  incentive16
for forward markets  differentiates  much more between  investors  and  in general
contributes  to make a much  stronger case in favor of  forward markets  for long
lived investments  as well.
TABLE  IXI:  Ratios of Variance  of E to Variance  of a
COUNTRII::  |,  LIS  Japan  Carmany
LATIN  AMERICA  |  |_|
Brazil  0.935  0.902  0.962
Chile  0.931  1.074  1.101
Mexico  2.352  3.138  3.287
SOUTH  ASIA  _
Bangladesh  15.214  14.816  13.350
India  3.533  4.806  3.735
Pakistan  4.808  23.833  25.960
Sri Lanka  5.361  8.028  6.430
EAST  ASIA
Indonesia  11.640  80.195  70.544
Malaysia  4.699  20.901  18.224
Philippines  2.214  2.886  2.223
Thailand  1.046  10.193  8.735
The indicators  suggest that the lack of forward markets  represent  a much
stronger  risk  for inveBtors  in South Asia  and in Indonesia  than  in the other
Regions  for  US investors.  The exchange  risk  is however  also very  strong  for
Japanese  and  German  investors  in  East  Asia.  In some countries  such as Pakistan,
the  exchange  risk  faced  by  a  Japanese  or  German  investor  is  about  6  times  the
risk  faced  by  a  US  investors.
C. Simulation  of ODtimal  Investment and Hedainci
The results of the previous section compared the riskiness of a completely
hedged investment with that of an unhedged investment.  In this section we derive17
the  optimal  amount  of  hedging  that  will  be  done  by the  firm.  Moreover  simulations
illustrate  how hedging and the level of investment  respond to the correlation
between the nominal depreciation  of the souirce  currency-(E)  and the inflation
differential (g).  Letting Z  be the quantity  of future  foreign currency  unit.
that the firm contracts  to sell at the end  of the period,  the firm  will earn a
profit  of (F-E)Z  on its sales of foreign  currency.  The profits of the JAPAUS
firm with hedging  will be
- =  aEq4(K) +  (W-K)r + (F-E)Z  (8)
where q  ef/P.  The firm will choose  K and Z to maximize  the expected  utility
of profits, given a joint  distribution  of the random  variables  h(a,q,E).
The solution  to thns problem is analyzed in Appendix A.  Several major
conclusions  emerge  from this analysis:
(1) if the only uncertainty  is due to thLe  fluctuations in the nominal
exchange  rate  (a  and  q  are  constants)  and  if  the  forward  rate  equals  the  expected
spot  rate,  then  the  firm  will  fully  insure  its  investment  (Z  - aq4(K))  and  the
level  of  investment  will  be  equivalent  to the  one  obtained  when the firm  is  risk
neutral.  In  this  case,  the  forward  rates  lead  to  full  insurance  of  exchange  rate
losses  and  the  firm  maximizes  expected  profits;
(2)  if  the  forward  rate  is  less  than  the  expected  spot  rate,  then  hedging
has a resource  cost to the firm  and  the  firm  will  purchase  less  than  the  full
amount  of coverage. Since  the  firm still  bears some  residual  risk in  this caser
it will invest  less in the host country  than would a  risk neutral firm;
(3)  if a and q are also uncertain,  the firm will be unable  to completely
hedge risk through  the use of forward  markets.  This iB because the return in
terms of host country  currency  is uncertain.
Table  III  shows  simulations  of  the  firm's  optimal  hedging  strategy.  It
illustrates  the  magnitude  of hedging  that  will  be done  and  the impact  of hedging
.on  the firm-z  investment  for different  levels  of correlation  between E and q,
pq. The five correlation  levels  were picked  to correspond  to those observed in
the countries covered  by Table 1  and hence provide a bridge with the country
specific  concerns  of a  potential investor--O  for Sri Lanka,  -.2 for Bangladesh18-
and Indonesia,  -.4 for  Pakistan,  Malaysia  and  Thailand,  -.6 for India  and Chile
and -.8 for Brazil,  Mexico and the Philippines.  The table compares  the foreign
inveutment  made without (K)  and with forward  markets (KF).  For the simulations
with  a  forward  market,  it  also  shows  how  much  future  foreign  currency  the  firm
iL interested  in  melling  at  the  end  of  the  period  (Z)  and  how  much  revenue  Lu
generated  by  the  project  (Revenue).  A crude  measure  of  the  importance  of  hedging
in  each  of  the  tables  is  provided  by. the  ratio  of  Z  to  Revenue.  It  can  vary  from
to  0  (no  hedging)  to  1  (complete  hedging).
Table  III  has  three  partu.  The  parts  differ  according  to  the elasticity  of
demand  for  capital  or  to  the  degree  of  risk  aversion.  In Table III A, the
elasticity  is moderate (2)  and  the firm  has  the  constant  absolute  risk  avermion
utility function upr) = -e> 3,  which corresponds  to a low risk aversion. The
simulations  assume  a  production  function  f(IC =  21(X}=)_.  The  exchange  rate and
the  random  variable  aq were  each  assumed  to  be  lognormally  distributed  with  mean
1.  Assuming  r =  1.05,  these  assumptions  yield  KR  =  100 and  X  =  210  in  the  case
of risk neutrality.  Table III B keeps the same risk averslon as Table A but
illustrates  the  effect  of a  higher  elasticity  of demand  for  capital (3.33).  Table
III C maintains  Table A's demand  elasticity  but doubles  risk aversion  to 0.2.
(i)  Investment  levels  without forward aarkets
The  second  column  of  Table  III  shows  the  firm's  optimal  investment  decision
when there are no forward  markets and  the firm is no longer  risk neutral.  When
the  nominal  exchange  rate is  uncorrelated  with  the  firm's  other  risks,  the firm's
investment  level  falls  as compared  to  the  risk  neutral  case. This  represents  the
impact  of risk on investment  in the host country  noted above.  For low  levels  of
correlation  between  the  nonimal  exchange  rate  and  the  inflation  differential,  the
larger  the elasticity  of demand  and the  larger  the  degree  of  risk  aversion,  the
larger  the  loBs  in  FDI--and  hence  in  local  tax  revenue  since  the  firm local
revenue  also  drops--as  compared  to  the  risk  neutral  cases.  The  loss  varies  from
16.9%  for  the  moderate  demand  elasticity  of  capital and low  risk  aversion  to19
31.4% in the  case of moderate demand elasticity of  capital but high risk
aversion.  In fact,  the model suggests  that the more risk averse the firm, the
larger  the negative  impact  on FDI.
From a practical  point of view, two lessons  emerge:
(1)  when countries  do not  manage  to follow  PPP in  the short  run--say  with
a correlation  coefficient  of less  than 0.8,  PDI can  be significantly  lower  when
firms are risk averse  and when there are no forward  markets to hedge against
exchange  rate risk. Most South  Asian economies  follow  poorly PPP.
(2)  risk aversion  is likely  to result  from imperfect  knowledge of host
economies; imperfect knowledge is often due to poor previous experience in a
specific  country.  One indicator  of the poor market  knowledge  is a low existing
7DI stock in any given country.  Once again,  the South  Asian economies fit the
mold.  They have the lowest  existing  stock  of FDI  and  hence  are  probably  the less
known  by foreign investors.  This may contribute  to explain  the flows.
(Ui)  Investment  levels  and demand  for  hedging  with  forward  markets
When the firm is given  the option of hedging  the exchange  rate risk in a
forward  market  where  the forward  rate  equals  the  expected  spot  rate,  the  exchange
risk leads  to lower investment  decline  than in  the case without forward  market
as  expected.  This is  illustrated  by the last  column  of the  table.  The table  also
shows  that this resu't is stronger  for short  lived assets  as discussed  above.
But  Table  III  provides  an  additional  useful  insights  for  the  cases  in  which
E is  uncorrelated  with its  other  risks.  The  closer  a country  is  to PPP,  the  lower
is the  demand  for  coverage  in  the forward  market  since  the  stronger  the  negative
correlation  between the inflation  differential  and exchange  rate fluctuations
provides a natural coverage  and thus reduces  the demand for hedging.  This is
illustrated  by  the column  Z/R.20
TABLE  IV
Optimal  Investment  and  Hedging  for  a  Risk-averse  Firm
A.  Elasticity  of  CapitaL Demand  - 2;  Risk Aversion  - .1
No Forward  Forward Narket
lMarket  - _  _
Correlation  FOI  without  FDI with  Ouantity  of  Revenue  ZJR  K/IKF
between  forward  market  forward  Currency the  generated
depreciation  CKC)  market  firm  is  by the
and  .(KF)  interested  project
inflation  in  selling  CR)
differentiaL  at  the  end
(Pqc)  of  the
.______________  ._________  _  period  (Z)
0.00  85.57  90.87  190.82  200.18  0.95  0.94
-0.20  87.94  91.20  157.16  200.55  0.78  0.96
-0.40  90.53  92.15  116.08  201.62  0.58  0.98
-0.60  93.37  93.88  78.80  203.47  0.39  0.99
-0.80  96.51  96.42  40.45  206.21.  0.20  1.00
B. Elasticity  of  Capital  Demard  = 3.33;  Risk Aversion  =  .1
No  Forward  Forward Markat
_____  _____  market  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
PqE  TK  KF  z  R  Z/R  KI/KF
0.00  84.33  89.39  134.08  138.67  0.97  0.94
-0.20  86.84  89.76  107.66  139.06  0.77  0.97
-0.40  89.60  90.88  61.75  140.29  0.56  0.99
-0.60  92.67  92.83  55.66  142.39  . 0.39  0.99
-0.80  96.11  95.78  28.79  145.54  0.Z0  1.00
C.  Elasticity  of  Capital  Demand  = 2;  Risk  Aversion  =  .2
lNo  Forward  Forward Market
Market  E  |  R  |  126  |  09  |  KF
0.00  j  76.1  83.82  176.01  192.26  0.92  -0.9121
-0.20  79.51  84.34  141.67  192.85  0.73  0.94
-0.40  83.42  85.92  108.23  194.65  0.56  0.97
-0.60  87.97  88.74  74.50  197.83  0.38  0.99
-0.80  93.39  93.19  39.10  202.73  0.19  1.00
Before concluding, note that when the correlation between depreciation  and
infaltion  differentials  becomes  very  high,  PDI  with  forward  market  tends  to
become  marginally  smaller  than  FDI without  forward  markets.  The  first  order
conditions  presented  in the appendLx show that the uncertainty  relating  to the
forward market  (Z) becomes larger than the uncertainty  due to males by the firm.
In other words, the risk associated with the forward market become so  much larger
than the risk to profits that they start dominating  the investnent  decision.
11I.  Optimal Host Government  Policy
Section  II derived the demand for hedging by the multinational  firm.  In
this section, we now analyze the optimal policy for the host country government.
We  assume  that  the  host  country  government  is risk  neutral,  and  desires  to
maximize  expected  national  income.  We assume  that  there  are  no  forward  exchange
markets,  but  that  the  host  country  government  can  write  a  forward  contract  for
foreign  exchange  with  the  multinational  when  it makes its investment.  As in the
case  with  forward  markets,  we  denote  by  Z  the  amount  of  units  of  its  currency
that  the  government  promises  to  buy  from  the  firm  at  the  end  of  the  period.  The
government  can  choose  the  price,  F, at which  it  will  buy  its  currency.
The  government  will  not  want  to  make  open-ended  guarantees  to  the  firm,
which  allow the firm to trade as much as it wants at the rate F.  If the country
were  to  make  an  open-ended  guarantee  at  a  particular  rate,  the  firm  could  make
arbitrarily  large  profits  (and  the  country  arbitrarily  large  losses)  in  the  event
that  the  rate  at  which  it  can  buy  foreign  exchange  turns  out  to  be  lower  than  the
market  rate.  If  the rate were higher than the market,  it  would  choose  to  buy
none.  The optimal  amount for the country to offer the firm will  be derived  as
part  of  the  optimization  problem.22
A. The Hoat Country 0 timization  Problem
National  income  for  the host country  can  be written as
ffr[Y(a, 1K)-as(k)- F-E)Z+T]i(a,E)dadE  (9)
where  Y(a,K) is  the  total  scoLal  value  of the investment  project, T is the  lump
sum  tax Imposed  on the multinational,  and j(a,E)  is the pdf for a  and E.  The
objective  of BAPAIN  is to maximize  (9),  subject  to the constraint  that the firm
earn a  utility level  that is  at least  as high  as that  obtained  it were  to invest
all its assets  in the home country.
The optimal  policy, as shown in the Appendix, is characterized  by three
conditions. First,  if  capital  is  being  paid its  marginal  product  in  the  foreign
country,  then  there  is no  motive  for  additional  taxes  or subsidies  linked  to the
quantity of  capital located in the  host country.  However, a  motive for
subsidization  of capital exists if there are spillovers associated  with the
quantity of capital located in the host country.  The most frequently  cited
example  would be technological  spillovere,  where the  presence  of a foreign  firm
allows  domestic  firms  to lower  their costs  by observing  the methods  used by the
foreign  firms.  This conclusion  is similar  to that obtained  in  the case  without
uncertainty, (see  for example  Corden (1974)).
Second,  the level  of forward  market  contracts  offered  to the firm  will be
the same as would be obtained  if a competitive  forward  market  existed  in which
the firm could sell foreign  currency  at the expected  spot rate.  This suggests
that  the contract  in the case in which  the government  contracts  optimally  with
the firm is equivalent  to that obtained if the government simply allows a
competitive  forward  market  to  operate,  assuming  that  there  are  other  risk  neutral
agents  who would contract  with the firm  in  the  forward  market.  There are  gains
to be had from the provision of risk-sharing  contracts for the firm,  but the23
government  has no inherent  advantage  over the  private  sector  in providing  these
contracts.
Finally, the lump mum tax should  be used to make the firm indifferent
between  enterlng  and  not entering  the  hoot country. This result  comes  from the
assumption  that the foroLgn  country  Ls a  monopolist. In a more general  settlng
Ln  which  both flrm and  government  have some  bargaining  power,  the  tax  negotlated
wlth the firm will be used to collect the government's  share of the project
returns. The  lump  sum  instrument  is  proferred  to capital  taxes  or forward  market
taxes for collecting  revenue,  because  it does not  distort  the firm's  choice  of
Lnput.  or hedging  activity.
B. The Timing  of Investment  Decisions
The above analysis  has been carrled out ln a static  model ln which the
firm's  decision  ls  whether  or  not  to invest  ln  the  host  country. Recently  it  has
been pointed out that an additional  role for uncertainty  arises in a dynamic
model,  where  the  firm is choosing  the  time at  whlch  to invest. Dixit (1989)  has
shown  that increases  in  the degree  of  uncertainty  will lead  to a  postponement  of
investment decisions when investments  are irreverslble.  Chapel  (1992) has
applied this to the case of a multinational  firm choosing between serving a
market from a home plant and a foreign plant.  The market is assumed to be
growing,  and the foreign  plant  has higher  fixed  costs  and lower  variable  costs
than  the  home  plant.  As the  market  grows  in  size  with  certainty  about  costs  in
each  market,  an  optimal  switching  point  occurs  where  the  firm  shlfts  from  serving
the  market  from  the  home  plant  to  the  forelgn  plant. She  ohows  that  the  presence
of real exchange  rate uncertainty,  the  time at which  the firm  switches  from  the
home  plant  to  the foreign  plant  is  postponed. The  postponement  results  from  the
fact  that when uncertainty  is  high, it is  more likely  that the firm  will suffer
bad luck in the future (i.e.  a reversal  of the real exchange  rate change)  that
makes it regret  the decision  to switch  to the foreign  market.
Consideration  of the  timing  of  decisions  leads  to effects  of real exchange
rate uncertainty  even for  risk neutral firms.  As in the previous  saction,  the24
availability  of forward  markete will lead to a reduction  in the degree of
uncertainty  for  the firm  to the  extent  that  nominal  exchange  rate changes  lead
to changes  in the  real exchange  rate.
IV.  Conclusions  and  Policy  Implications
These  reBults  of sections  II and  III  suggest  that  the quantity  of foreign
investment  can  be increased  and  the  timing  of investment  decisions  accelerated
if  markets  are  available  in  which  firms  can  hedge  real  exchange  rate  risk. The
magnitude  of these  benefits  depends  on  the  correlation  between  nominal  exchange
rate  movements  and  real  exchange  rate  movements,  and  also  on  the  type  of  business
the  firm  is  engaged  in.  The  theory  suggests  that  the  benefits  are  greatest  for
investments  that  are  targeted  for  the  host  country  market.  For  export-oriented
investments,  the firm is likely  to be naturally  insured  by the fact that its
output price is likely  to be highly correlated  with movements in the real
exchange  rate. Empirical  evidence  suggests  that  the  benefits  of hedging  nominal
exchange  risk  are likely  to be greatest  for  short-lived  investments,  since  the
correlation  between  real  exchange  rates  and  nominal  exchange  rates  is likely  to
be highest  in  the short  run.  In the long  run, a tendency  to  reversion  toward
purchasing  power  parity  rates  is likely  to provide  insurance  for  firmsi  against
fluctuations  in nominal  exchange  rates.
If  countries  do  not  currently  have  developed  forward  markets  in  operation,
the question  arises of how the insurance  against  exchange  rate fluctuations
should  be  provided  for  firms. One  option  is  for  the  government  to encourage  the
formation  of  forward  markets. A second  would  be for  the  government  to negotiate
forward  contracts  or currency  options  with the firm  as part of the package  it
offers  the  firm  when  it enters  the  host  country.
There  are  two  reasons  which  suggest  that  policy  of  liberalizing  financial
markets  and allowing  forward  markets  to  develop  is  the  preferred  route.  The
first  is that  the  policy  of  providing  coverage  to  multinationals  discriminates
against  domestic  firms.  As noted above, forward  markets  will  also  provide
valuable  insurance  to  domestic  firms,  particularly  those  that  are  engaged  in25
export-oriented activities.  If access to insurance of thls type is denied to
domestic  firms,  then  they will  be  at  a  disadvantage  in  competing  against
multinationals who do not face real exchange rate risk on export sales from the
host country.
A second reason occurs because of the possibility that the government is
not risk neutral.  If  the host country  governmcnt is constrained in itB  borrowing
in  world  financial  markets,  it  may be  more  appropriate  to  treat  the  host
government as  risk averse.  The possibility that  the host government is also risk
averse  does  not eliminate  the  possibility of  gains  from  insurance,  but  it
introduces a slightly different teot of when mutually beneficial insurance may
take place.  For example, suppose two agents  with equal degrees of relative risk
aversion have incomes which depend on the realization of the nominal exchange
rate, yl(E)  and y2(E).  It is easily shown  that the optimal insurance scheme will
be  for  1  to  make  a  payment  to  2  whenever  y,/y 2 exceeds a critical value, and 2
will  insure  1  when  relative  incomes  are  less  than  the  critical  value."
This  suggests that it  will  make  sense  for  governments  to  insure  firms
against real depreciations of the host country  currency if the firm in harmed
relatively more than the host country government is by a currency depreciation.
Since a high percentage of the host country government's assets are likely  to be
denominated in local  currency, it  is  open  to question  as  to whether this question
will be satisfied in general.  An alternative way to express this is to say that
requiring the government to  provide  the  insurarce  to  finis against exchange risk
imposes an unnecessary constraint on who provides the insurance to firms.  In
some situations (eg.  a  risk averse government),  there may be other agents  who are
in  a  better  position  to  supply  the  insurance  in  competitive  markets.  Encouraging
the  formation  of  forward  markets  allows  the  market  to  determine  who  is  best  able
to  provide  this  insurance.
It should be noted, however, that in the process  of liberalization of
financial  markets  and  currencv  convertibility,  forward  exhange  contracts  between
the  government  and  firms  may  be  a  useful  transitional  device.  For  a  country  with
exchange  controls,  uncertainty  about  the  ability  to  obtain  foreign  exchange  in26
the future  may limit  the ability  of lndivlduals  to sell forward  contracts  for
foreign  currency  for  foreign  investors  who  want  to  hedge  exchange  rLsk. In  this
transitional  period, forward  contracts  offered  by the government  would be a
useful  instrument  for  reducing  uncertainty  to  firms. The  arguments  above  suggest
that  these forward  contracts  should  be offered  to host  country  firms  as well.
As  shown  in the  companion paper, this case for  forward contracts as  a
transitional  device  is further  strenghened  in  cases  where  the firm  is  uncertain
whether  the  country  is committed  to reform.
Finally,  note that there is no motivation  for government  provision  of
insurance  for other  types  of risks (eg.  insuring  firm against  risks  of doing
business  in the host country)  that are not normally  provided  by competitive
insurance  markets.  These  types  of insurance  are  not provided  by competitive
markets  because  of  moral  hazard  and  adverse  selection  problems. Thus,  insurance
is not  available  against  business  losses  because  if firms  are insured  against
losses,  it  will reduce  their  incentive  to  keep  costs  down. Since  the  government
has no advantage  over competitive  markets in dealing  with this moral hazard
problem, government insurance  of this type would be highly inefficient.27
Appendix
A.  Optimal  Firm  fedging  with  Forward  Markets
Utilizing  the  firm  profit  expression  (S) the  expected  utility  of  the  firm
will be
fff[TuaqE4K)+(W-K)xo+Z(F-E)nh(a,q,E)duadE  (A.1)
The first  order  conditions  for  optimal  choice  of X and Z  are
fffu's)  (aqE'(K)  -r)h(rz,q,E)dsdqdE  (A.2a)
fffu'(x  (F-E)h(a,q,E)dmdqdE  (A.2b)
In the special  case where there is no uncertainty  regarding  a or q, (A.lb)
simplifies  to
U'(w)  (F-E)  f(E)  dE=O
where  fg  is the  pdf for  E.  If the  forward  rate equalo  the expected  spot  rate,
then (A.2) is satisfied  with Z =  aqo(K),  since  this fully insures  the firm
against  exchange  rate  fluctuations  and  eliminates  the  variation  in  v.  With  full
insurance,  the first  order  condition  for  optimal  choice  of R is equivalent  to
that for  the  risk neutral  firm.  If  the forward  rate  is less  than the  expected
spot  rate,  then  the  firm  will  purchase  less  than  full  insurance  against  exchange
fluctuations  (Z  <  aqp(K))  because  of the  higher  cost  of insurance. The firm's
profits  will be  positively  correlated  with  E under  optimal  hedging,  so  the firm
will  reduce  its  value  of K below  that  which  niaximizeu  expected  profits.
In cases  where a and q are variable,  the finm will be unable  to fully
insure  against  exchange  fluctuations  through  the  use  of forward  markets.  This
iB  due to the fact that the firm's  returns  in the host country  currency  are
uncertain  and  cannot  be fully  hedged,  so aqo(K)-Z  will be a random  variable.
B.  Optimal  Host  Country  Policy  with  Risk  Averse  Firms28
The objective function for the host country is given by
ff[Y(x,K)-a4(K)-(F-E)z.T]j (s,E)dadE  AS)
where  j(a,E)  is the pdf  for a  and E.  The host  country will be treated  as
choosing K,  Z, and T to maximize  (A.3), subject to the constraint  that the
multinational be willing to invest in the host country,
ffu-  |  waqE(K)  +(W-K)r+(F-E)Z)h(aq,E)d(sq)dEU(rW)  (A4)
This approach can be used to derive the optimal taxes to be imposed on KC and Z
in  the optimal solution.  The first  order conditions for choice of  quantities can
be compared with the firm's first order conditions for choice of quantities in
(6)  to yield the taxes required to achieve the country's optimal levels.
Forming the Lagrangean from (A.3)  and (A.4), the necessary conditions for
the optimal policy are obtained by  differentiating  with  respect to K, Z, T, and
F:
ff  [ay-a(K)  Ij  (aCe)dazde=l(ffU'(x)  (mO'(K)-r)h(osq,E)d(aq)dE  (




Since home country  welfare is increasing in T and firm welfare is decreasing in
T, the country will always choose a value of T such that the constraint  (A.4)
holds with  strict  equality.  Therefore,  the  Lagrange multiplier  I  will  be
positive and equal to the inverse of the expected marginal utility of income for
the firm from (A.5c).
The optimal value of K is determined by  (A.5a).  If capital is paid its
social marginal product, then the left hand of (A.5a) is zero.  Therefore, the29
optimal value of R'  will be one at  which the right hand side of (A.5a) equals 0.
Comparing with (A.2a),  it is  seen  that the firm's optimal choice of iC coincides
with the one that maximizes host country welfare.  Therefore, it is optimal to
impose no tax on X.  Note that if  a subsidy to capital (tax  on capital) will be
optimal in cases where the marginal social  product of capital is greater (less)
than the amount that capital is paid.
The  optimal  forward  contracts  between  the  host  country  and  the  firm  are
determined  by  (A.5b)  and  (A.5d).  Note  that  condition  (A.5d)  is  automatically
satisfied when  (A.5c) is satisfiod, since an increase  in  T  is  equivalent to a
reduction in F  in effect when Z > 0.  A reduction in P reduces the profits the
firm receives from its sales of foreign currency  (when Z  >  0), which has an
equivalent effect on profits to an increase in the lump sum tax.  Therefore, we
can  set  F  equal  to  the  expected  value  of  E,  denoted  x,  without  loss  of
generality.  If F =  E,  then the left hand side of (A.3b)  equals 0.  The optimal
value of Z will then be the one for  which maximizes the expected utility of the
firm (i.e.  the right had side of (A.3b)  equals 0).  From (6b),  this is the value
of Z that would be chosen by the fi-m if it were facing competitive forward
markets  in  which  the  forward  rate  equalled  the  expected  spot  rate.  If  the
country were to choose a rate different than E, then  the  right  hand  side  of
(A.Sb)  would not be equal to  zero.  This  would  mean  that  the  optimal value of Z
would not maximize the firm's expected utility at the chosen value of F, which
would  imply  a  tax  or  subsidy to forward market transactions.  Thus, any choice
of  F other than E  must be accompanied by a tax or subsidy that is equivalent in
effect to having forward market transactions take place at B.
These results  indicate that the choice of an optimal  forward contract
between  the  country  and the  firm  can equivalently  be  achieved  by  allowing
competitive  forward  markets.  This  conclusion  has  been  derived  under  the
assumption that the host country is a monopolist, and can thus choose a policy
that extract all the surplus from the investment project.  However, it can be
shown  that  this  conclusion  regarding  forward  markets  will  continue  to  hold  if  the
problem  is  considered  as  one  of  bilateral  monopoly,  with  the  firm  and  country30
bargaining  over the split of the surplus from the project.  The efficient
frontier  for the bilateral  bargaining  problem is described  by maximizing  the
expected  return  to the foreign  country,  given  a constraint  on expected  utility
similar  to (A.4)  with utility  exceeding  U(rW).31
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1. For an overvLew of forward to  cover  exchange risks in LDCe, see Quirk, PTJ.
et alt. (1988),  Policies  for  Developino  Forward  Foretan  Exchange  Markets,  IMF
Occasional  Paper  60,  June.
2. The framework  offered  here could  be applied  to a larger  set of issues.  In
essence,  it applie, to all  firm. in  the  host economy with assets  and income  whose
value depends  on "rupee"  prices (including  traded  goods through  the exchange
rate)  and liabilities  (or  euity)  denominated  in "dollars".
3. In particular,  this assumption  rules  out any  role for forward  contracts  as
providing  credibility  to  gov.rnment  reform  policies. This  case  is  considered  in
a companion  paper.
4.  How  common  are  rink  averse  firma?  Taxes,  information  or  transactions  costs
may  lead  to a  demand  for  hedging  by  the  firm  as  it  can  no  longer  simply  diversify
the risk associated  with the randomness  of its returns  by diversifying  its
portfolio.  For  instance,  a  firm  often  has  private  information  about  its  actions.
Resulting  problems  of  adverse  selection  and  moral  hazard  lead  to  agency  costs  and
make tc-ternal  financing  of projects  more  costly  than retained  earnings.  Hence,
firms  wJ.L6  a low cash flow will have a higher cost of external  funding.  An
increase  in  the  variance  of  the  firm's  earnings  then  raises  the  probability  that
the firm  enters  the region  of "financial  distress".
The desire  to decrease  the  variability  of their  earnings,  and  hence  the
expected  costs  of financing  projects,  explains  why  many  firma  behave  as  if they
were  risk  averse  in  a  developing  country  setting.  There  empirical  evidence  on  the
demand  for  hedging  consistent  with  this  explanation.  For  instance,  Nance,  Smith,
and  Smithson (1993)  provide tests of  the various standard hypotheses in
explaining  the  hedging  behavior  of a sample  of 104  firms  for 1986.  They find
that: (i)  firms  with  more  convex  tax  functions  engage  in  more  hedging;  (ii)  that
there  is  a  role  for-  agency  costs  in  explaining  hedging. Mayers  and  Smith  (1990)
also find  a role for  diversification  of owners  in explaining  hedging  behavior.
Therefore,  we will use  the assumption  of risk aversion  as the simplest  way of
capturing  the firm's  demand  for  hedging  in the  static  model.
S.  Broll  and Wahl  (1992) present a  similar model  in which W  has  the
interpretation  of being the  stock of firm-specific  capital which the firm
allocates  between  the  home  and  foreign  countries. Their  approach  is  consistent
with the approach  taken  by Caves (19  ),  who argues  that muLtinationals  arise
because  of the  presence  of firm-specific  assets  developed  by the firm.  These
assets  give  the firm an advantage  in competition  with local  firms  in the  host
market. Alternatively,  W can  be  set  equal  to  0  and  the  home  country  return  R can
be interpreted  as the rate at which  the firm can borrow  in the host country
markets.
6.If  the  BAPAIN consumption  good  and  the  JAPAUS consumption  good  are  the  same
(composite)  good,  then  the  law  of  one  price  will  be  equivalent  to  purchaslng
power  parity. If the  respective  goods  are  different  commodities,  then the  law
of  one  price  is  not  sufficient  to  ensure  purchasing  power  parity.33
7. First,jnote  that  from  the  concavity  of U  and  0  that (2)  is  decreasing  in  X.
The  value  K  solves  (2)  for  the risk  neutral  case  where  U' is a constant. If  U
is  concave,  U' is  decreasing  in  a  and (2)  will  be negative  when  evaluated  at  K ,
which  means  that  the  optimal  K* is  less  than  X.  A similar  argument  establishes
that  an  increase  in  the  riskiness  of  ae,  as  defined  by  a  mean  preserving  spread,
will  reduce  the optlmal  K*.
B.  In  designing  these  insurance  contracts,  the  possibility  that  the  firm  can  make
arbitrage  profits using the forward contracts,  through  transactions  such am
"round-triping"  commonly  observed  in  Latin  America  or  in  East  Asia  for  instance,
should  be  avoided.  For  example,  suppose  that  the  firm  can  lend  1  rupee  at  the
beginning  of  the  period  at  a  rate  of  r.  It  capital  will  be  1+r  at  the  end  of  the
period.  If  the firm  can  negotiate  a  forward  rate  F, the  capital  becomes  (14r)F
at the end of the period.  Now assume  that the firm is holding  dollars  which
represent  capital  flight  and  that  the  opportunity  coat  of  these  dollars  is  r*.
The  firm  could  make  a  risk  free  profit  on  the  forward  contract  if (l+r)F>r*.  Then
no  new  investment  result  from  the  contract,  only  a  transfer  to the  firm.  In  sum,
the constraint (l+r)Pcr*  must be satisfied  by the negotiated  rate. If the
financial  markets  are  restricted  in  the  host  country  and  transaction  are  costly
as in  many South  Asian  countries,  this condition  is likely  to be satisfied.
9. A recent  paper  by  Froot  (1993)  has  examined  the  potential  gains  from  hedging
investments  between  the  US and  UK.  He  finds  that  for  investments  with  a life  of
more  than  several  years,  hedged  portfolios  have  greater  variance  than  unhedged
portfolios.
10. The value of p is an indicator  of the degree  of benefit  US firms  would
receive  from  hedging  a one  year real  investment  in  the country.  The  mum  of the
mean  annual  rate  of  nominal  depreciation  over  the  full  period  pE  and  of  the  mean
inflation  differential  p  would  give  an  indication  of  the  extent  to which  the
average  change  over  the  period  is  consistent  with  purchasing  power  parityg  since
PPP  predicts  that  pE  +  Pq =  0.
11.  Suppose  the  utility  function  is  U  = y, which  exhibits  constant  relative  risk
aversion. The  optimal  insurance  scheme  involves  choosing  bl(E)  to maximize
fu(y(E)  +bl(E))f  (E)dE
-1
subject  to
fu(Y 2(E)-b 1(E)  f(E)dB2U 2
where  b 1(E)  ig  the  payment  by  2  to  1.  The  solution  to  this  problem  has  the  form
b1(E)  - (1y 2(E)-y,(E))/(1+K).  Thus,  2 will  make  a  payment  to  1  whenever  y2/y1 >
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